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Property
Property; Eminent Domain Law
Code of Civil Procedure Title 7 (commencing with §1237) (repealed); §§1240.680, 1240.700; Title 7 (commencing with
§1230.010) (new).
AB 11 (McAlister); STATS 1975, Ch 1275
(Effective July 1, 1977)

Support: State Bar of California; California Law Revision Commission; California Association of Realtors
Opposition: County Supervisors' Association of California; League
of California Cities; Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors
Repeals Sections 1237 through 1267 of the Code of 'Civil Procedure relating to eminent domain and enacts the Eminent Domain
Law; provides for a "resolution of necessity" by all public agencies
exercising eminent domain; permits a taking for future use; permits
deposits of the probable compensation amount without a court
order; liberalizes prejudgment possession procedure; provides for a
new date of valuation; provides for compensation for severance
damages, loss of goodwill, and improvements; provides for compensation of divided interests;simplifies post-judgment procedure.

Chapter 1275 has been enacted to create the Eminent Domain Law,
effective July 1, 1976, which revises and simplifies eminent domain proceedings in California. The new statute is the result of a ten-year study
by the California Law Revision Commission in compliance with a 1965
directive from the legislature [CAL. STATS. 1965, Res. Ch. 130, at
5289]. Although the former provisions purported to be a comprehensive and systematic statement of the law of eminent domain [CAL. LAW
REVISION COMM'N,

12

REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS,

AND STUDIES

1601, 1627 (1974) (hereinafter cited as REPORT)] the California Law
Revision Commission found it inadequate to meet modem needs because
its poor draftsmanship had created a hodgepodge of duplications and
inconsistencies written in barely, understandable language [Id.]. The
new Eminent Domain Law has replaced this legal morass, and constitutes a complete compilation of the law. It provides one uniform statute
applicable to all condemnors and all condemnation proceedings, and
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eliminates over 28,000 words of unnecessary language [REPORT, supra,
at 1628]. In addition to the complete revision of specific eminent domain
procedures, conforming changes throughout the codes have been made
to eliminate further duplications and inconsistencies by the enactment
of a series of bills designed to supplement Chapter 1275.
Several major changes have been made in pretrial rights and remedies,
and the issue of compensation has been expanded and clarified with regard to the value of the property taken, improvements, and loss of goodwill. Generally, the trial and post-trial procedures are unchanged except that the language of the old provisions has been rewritten into a
more understandable form. The definition of property subject to acquisition by eminent domain has been expanded to include any interest
in real or personal property and any type of right, title, or interest capable of being taken for public use [REPORT, supra, at 1693].
The Eminent Domain Law is now the exclusive law governing the
exercise of the power of condemnation by public agencies [REPORT at
1628]. Therefore, any public or quasi-public agency authorized by the
legislature to condemn property for a public use, and wishing to do so,
must proceed according to the provisions of the Eminent Domain Law.
However, the Public Utilities Commission is still statutorily authorized
to determine compensation despite the general rule that compensation
is to be decided by the courts [CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§1206-1218,
1401-1421].
PretrialProceedings
Chapter 1275 has retained the rule that all eminent domain proceedings are to be commenced by the filing of a complaint in the superior
court of the county in which the property sought to be taken is located
[CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 1250.010 (hereinafter all section number references will be to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified)]. While the former law required that a lis pendens be filed at
the commencement of the eminent domain proceedings, the Eminent
Domain Law now provides that such filing is discretionary unless service
of summons is by newspaper publication. With respect to pleadings,
the requirement of a statement of right to take in the complaint (§1244)
has been expanded to codify judicial requirements that the plaintiff
declare (1) the public use for which the property is being taken, (2)
the factors giving rise to the necessity of the taking, and (3) the plaintiff's power to take by eminent domain under specific statutory authorization (§1250.310(d)) [See REPORT, supra, at 1766; see, e.g., Linggi v.
Garovotti, 45 Cal. 2d 20, 27, 286 P.2d 15, 20 (1955)]. The complaint
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must still contain the names of the parties and the description of the
property to be taken, as well as a statement of any ownership interest
the plaintiff may have in it. When a party is represented by an attorney,
the pleadings need not be verified, but must be signed by the attorney
(§1250.030). All other rules of pleading in an eminent domain proceeding are unchanged from the former law.
Chapter 1275 does not affect the defendant's right to a jury trial in
the determination of issues concerning compensation because that right
is afforded by the California Constitution [CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 19].
In lieu of a trial, the parties may agree to arbitrate the issue of compensation as provided for in Sections 1273.010 through 1273.050.
These arbitration procedures are identical to those contained in the
former law.
Rules regarding the order of proof, order of argument, and burden
of proof in issues of compensation are unchanged by the Eminent Domain Law. The defendant must still present his or her evidence as to
compensation first, and must present first and last closing arguments relating to compensation (§1260.210). However, the Eminent Domain
Law expands the defendant's ability to dispute the condemnor's right
to take in several situations (see discussion, infra); and consequently,
he or she has the burden of proving that the public agency has no such
right (§§1240.230 (burden of proof in disputing future taking is on
the defendant), 1240.420 (burden of producing evidence regarding resolution of necessity on the defendant), 1240.520 (burden of proving
incompatible public use on the defendant), 1240.620 (burden of proving that there is not a more necessary use on the defendant), 1245.250
(burden of producing evidence regarding invalidity of resolution of necessity on defendant)).
The Right to Take

The power of eminent domain may now only be exercised by a person
or entity authorized by statute to use such a power, and a taking for
a public use must be for a current project. While the former law permitted private individuals to condemn in exceptional circumstances,
such persons are not authorized to condemn under the Eminent Domain
Law. If there is a reasonable probability that the date of use will be
within seven years of the commencement of the proceeding (the date
the complaint is filed), or ten years if the condemning agency is taking
pursuant to the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1973 [23 U.S.C. §101 et
seq. (Supp. III, 1973)], a taking for future use is permissible (§§1240.Selected 1975 California Legislation
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220, 1240.250). This continues the prior right of a condemnor to take
land for anticipated future needs. However, a significant change in California eminent domain law now permits the defendant to attack a condemnation proceeding if there is no reasonable probability of use within
a reasonable time. The defendant may object to the necessity of a taking for future use, but he has the burden of proving that there is no
reasonable probability that the date of use will be within seven years
(or ten years) of the commencement of the proceeding (§1240.230).
Prior law treated future taking as an issue of necessity; therefore, an objection could only be raised when the resolution was not conclusive as
to issues of necessity [REPoRT, supra, at 1712].
In order to invoke eminent domain powers, the members of the governing body or agency exercising eminent domain must find public necessity for the taking stated in a resolution at a public meeting (§ 1240.030). Notice of the hearing must be sent by first class mail to each
person whose property is to be acquired, and whose name and address
appears on the last equalized county assessment roll (§1245.235).
Chapter 1275 clarifies and simplifies the language of former Section
1241, but does not change the requirements that the resolution contain
a general statement of the public use for which the property will be utilized, a description of the property, and a declaration that the project
is necessary to the public interest (§1245.230). A valid resolution precludes judicial review of the issue of necessity (§1245.250); however,
Chapter 1275 has provided a limited basis for attacking the resolution
that was not available under the former law. The resolution is not effective if (1) one of the voting members of the governing body adopting
the resolution received or agreed to receive a bribe (§1245.270), or (2)
the resolution was the result of a gross abuse of discretion (§1245.255).
The resolution of necessity is conclusive only on public necessity, and
does not affect the right of a defendant to contest the right to take his
property on other specific statutory grounds provided for in Chapter
1275 [REPoRT, supra, at 1748; §§1240.230 (future taking), 1240.340
(exchange), 1240.620 (more necessary public use), 1240.050 (extraterritorial condemnation)].
To protect the defendant from hardship caused by the public agency's
delay in commencing eminent domain proceedings, Chapter 1275 has
clarified the defendant's rights and remedies against the agency after the
adoption of the resolution. If the eminent domain proceeding is not
commenced within six months of the adoption of the resolution of necessity, the property owner may institute an action for inverse condemnation to recover damages for any property depreciation or loss of use
Pacific Law lournal Vol. 7
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due to the imminence of the project, or he may sue for a writ of mandate
to compel the public agency to rescind its resolution or commence eminent domain proceedings (§1245.260). The suit for inverse condemnation must be brought within 18 months of the date of adoption of
the resolution; however, a writ of mandate may be sought at any time.
This section provides a new remedy for the property owner which can
be used to protect his or her property from fluctuations in value caused
by the uncertainty of the proposed project [REPORT, supra, at 1751].

In the past, California eminent domain law provided for the deposit
of the probable amount of compensation by the condemnor in order to
receive prejudgment possession of the property only in certain situations,
and such deposit could only be made by an ex parte application to
the court for an order of deposit in the state treasury [former §§1243.4,
1243.5, 1243.6, CAL. STATS. 1961, c. 1613, §§1-3, at 3442]. Section
1255.010 of the Code of Civil Procedure has abrogated that rule, permitting the plaintiff to deposit the probable amount of compensation in
the state treasury without a court order in order to establish an early
date of property valuation (see discussion, infra). Furthermore, the
plaintiff may determine the probable amount of compensation by using
its own appraiser, although an affidavit stating the basis of the appraisal
must be filed with the court. Additionally, the property owner may
compel the condemnor to make a deposit of the probable amount of
compensation. However, if such a request is complied with, the public
agency has the right, upon ex parte application to the court, to receive
an order of possession that authorizes the agency to take possession 30
days after the date of deposit (§1255.040). If the agency fails to deposit the probable amount of compensation by the date specified by the
defendant, the final compensation awarded to the defendant will draw
full legal interest from the date the deposit was supposed to have been
made. As with other eminent domain motions, the requested date of
deposit can be challenged by the condemnor as being unreasonable
(§ 1255.040).
The right of the defendant to withdraw deposit funds has not been
significantly changed by the new Eminent Domain Law. Any defendant wishing to withdraw his or her share from the deposit must apply
to the court for an order to do so, and the plaintiff may object to such
application of withdrawal pursuant to Section 1255.230. Undertakings
(written guarantees of payment) by sureties of the defendant wishing
to withdraw the deposit must still be filed for security if there are conflicting claims to the money, or where the amount withdrawn exceeds
the amount deposited. Finally, withdrawal by a defendant continues
Selected 1975 California Legislation
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to operate as a waiver of all defenses to the taking except for a claim
to greater compensation (§ 1255.260).
Right to Possession
The Eminent Domain Law has changed the plaintiff's right to possession prior to final judgment by allowing immediate possession in all
eminent domain proceedings (§1255.410).
Previously, Section
1243.4 [CAL. STATS. 1961, c. 1613, §1, at 3442] permitted immediate
possession in proceedings to obtain reservoir and right of way lands.
Section 1255.410 now permits the plaintiff to request, by way of ex
parte application, an order for immediate possession of any property
being sought by eminent domain. The court will grant the order if (1)
the plaintiff is entitled to take the property in question under the Eminent Domain Law, and (2) the plaintiff has deposited the probable
amount of compensation in the state treasury pursuant to Section
1255.010 of the Code of Civil Procedure (§ 1255.410).
Despite the expansion of the right to immediate possession, Section
1255.420 gives the property owner or occupant a right to move for relief
from the order of possession if he can show that he would suffer substantial hardship from the execution of the order. This is a new remedy
in California eminent domain law; however, the objections must be
made within 30 days of the issuance of the order of posssession. The
defendant may also object to the plaintiffs authority to take (§1255.430), in which case the order will be stayed until the court has ruled
on the objection. When ruling on the defendant's motion, the court
may modify or stay the order of possession as it sees fit after it has
balanced the defendant's hardship against the public necessity of immediate possession [REPORT, supra, at 1795]. When the order of possession is
finally given, it may not be served on the defendant less than 90 days
before the plaintiff wishes to take possession if the property contains a
dwelling, business or farm. However, possession on shorter notice is
possible in cases of urgent need (§§1255.420, 1255.410). The preliminary determination of the condemnor's right to take by eminent domain
does not prejudice the defendant's right to demur to the complaint or
to contest the taking at the trial [REPORT, supra, at 1794].

Compensation
In order to determine the compensation award for property taken by
eminent domain, the value of the property must be established. Because
of fluctuations in real estate values, a fixed point in time must be chosen
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 7
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(the valuation date), and the appraised value of the property at that
time becomes the basis for compensation in condemnation proceedings.
Thus, the method for determining the valuation date becomes critical
because market fluctuations may cause the price to go either up or down
within a short time, and although the effect of the project's imminence
on value is not to be included in the appraisal (§1263.330), a completely objective appraisal report after the project has become public
knowledge is impossible.

Whereas former Section 1247

[CAL. STATS.

1961, c. 1613, §5, at

3446] set the valuation date as the date of service of summons, the Eminent Domain Law now provides that it is to be determined by the date
of deposit of the probable amount of compensation if there is no earlier
determination date applicable (§1263.110). Once the valuation date
is set by the deposit date, it cannot be changed to a later date [RMEPoRT,
supra, at 1822]. However, if a deposit has not been made, the date of valuation is the date of the commencement of the eminent domain proceeding if the issue of compensation is brought to trial within one year
(§1263.120). When the issue of compensation is not brought to trial
within one year after commencement of the proceeding, the valuation
date is the date of the commencement of the trial unless the delay is
caused by the defendant. If the defendant causes the delay, the valuation
date is the date of the commencement of the proceeding. When a retrial
or a new trial is not initiated within one year of the commencement of the
proceeding, the valuation date is the date of the new trial unless the
judge modifies the date in the interest of justice (§§1263.140,
1263.150).
Amount of Award
In eminent domain actions, the single most important issue is the

value of the condemned property

[CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE

BAR, CONDEMNATION PRACTICE IN CALIFORNIA

27 (1973)].

Prior to

the enactment of the Eminent Domain Law, the value of the property
was called the "actual value", and no formula was given for computing
it. Section 1263.310 of the Code of Civil Procedure now provides that
the measure of compensation is to be the fair market value of the property taken. The definition of "fair market value" has been codified from
judicial decisions to be the highest price that a leisurely seller would accept, and a willing buyer would pay for the property, each with knowledge of the full uses of which the property is capable (§ 1263.320) [See,
e.g., Buena Park School Dist. v. Metrim Corp., 176 Cal. App. 2d 255,
263, 1 Cal. Rptr. 250, 255-56 (1959)]. Enhancement or diminution
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of the property value due to the imminence of the project is not to be
computed into the compensation figure (§ 1263.330).
In addition to receiving compensation for fair market value, the defendant may now receive compensation for improvements made to the
property after commencement of the proceedings, and for loss of goodwill (§1263.510). Compensation for such improvements and loss of
goodwill was previously unrecoverable. To receive compensation for an
improvement, the defendant must show that (1) the improvement was
one made by a public utility to maintain its equipment, (2) the improvement was made with the written consent of the plaintiff, or (3) the improvement was authorized by a court order issued after a noticed hearing
and a finding of hardship upon the defendant if he was not permitted
to make the improvement (§1263.240). Compensation is now permitted for loss of goodwill in business enterprises forced to move because of condemnation (§1263.510). However, goodwill loss is recoverable only to the extent that it cannot reasonably have been prevented
by relocation or other efforts by the owner to mitigate his or her loss
(§1263.510(a) (2)).

Compensation is also provided for any damage occurring to any remaining property after a taking of a larger portion by eminent domain
(§1263.410). Although former Section 1248 permitted compensation for injury to the remaining property, the law was unclear as to
whether damage to the remaining parcel was recoverable if the damagecausing portion of the project was not located on the property from
which the remaining parcel was severed. Section 1263.410 now allows
recovery for damages to the remainder caused by the project even if the
portion from which the remainder was severed is not used in the construction of the project [REPORT, supra,at 1836].
A leasehold is now terminated by acquisition of the property for public use if all of the leasehold is taken (§1265.110), codifying the rule
that the taking of the entire demised premises by eminent domain operates to release the tenant from liability for subsequently accruing rent
[See, e.g., City of Pasadena v. Porter, 201 Cal. 381, 387, 257 P. 526,
528 (1927)]. If there is a partial taking, the lease is partially terminated to the extent of the taking unless the taking so destroys the value
or utility of the lease that a partial termination would create an unreasonable burden on the lessee (§1265.130). Former law provided that
the lessee was still liable for rent after a partial taking [Id. at 387, 257
P. at 528]. Section 1265.120 changes this rule by reducing the rent
due proportionate to the amount of the leasehold taken. However, the
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 7
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parties to a lease may change their respective rights and obligations differently, with regard to eventual eminent domain proceedings, rather
than be subject to those specified in the Eminent Domain Law (§1265.160). Liens, another divisible interest covered by the Eminent Domain
Law, have been expanded to include mortgages, deeds of trust, or other
security interests in property whether they arise from contract, statute,
common law, or equity. The condemnor, if it takes a parcel encumbered by a lien that is not yet due, may deduct the lien from the judgment and continue payments until the indebtedness is paid. However,
if the taking is partial, a lienholder is entitled to share in the award only
to the extent of the impairment of his security (§1265.225). Furthermore, Chapter 1275 allows the lienholder and property owner to agree
between themselves, after the proceeding has commenced, as to the apportionment of the award (§1265.225 (b)).
Post-TrialPossession
Post-trial procedures regarding possession after judgment are essentially identical with prejudgment possession procedures in that ample notice must be given before possession can be acquired. However, the tenday notice period before the plaintiff takes possession pursuant to a pretrial order (§1255.410) has been extended to 30 days notice of occupied property to alleviate hardship on the defendant (§1268.220). With
respect to the defendant's remedies if the judgment is not paid to him,
he may seek an execution of the judgment, or he may seek a dismissal
of the proceeding (§1268.020). If the defendant seeks the latter remedy, he must file in court and send the plaintiff written notice of the
failure to pay the judgment. The court will order a dismissal 20 days
after the plaintiff has been served with notice if the plaintiff fails to pay
the judgment.
Expenses
The defendant may recover his litigation expenses whenever the proceeding is dismissed for any reason, or where the plaintiff cannot acquire
the property (§1268.610). Furthermore, Section 1268.610 now requires that the defendant be awarded his litigation expenses when the
proceeding has been dismissed for failure to prosecute. Under prior law,
the defendant was not entitled to expenses upon such failure [REPORT,
supra, at 1866]. The defendant may still receive his court costs and his
appeal costs as provided for in the former law (§ §1268.710, 1268.720),
the justification being that to require the defendant to pay any portion
of his cost necessarily incidental to the trial would reduce the compensaSelected 1975 California Legislation
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tion awarded by the jury [REPORT, supra, at 1868]. This rule is subject to
the procedural limitations that (1) defendants with a single, unified interest may be allowed only a single cost bill, and (2) the costs of determining title as between two or more defendants must be borne by such
defendants [REPORT, supra, at 1869].
COMMENT
,One of the major areas of change in the new Eminent Domain Law
has occurred in precondemnation activities. A public agency wishing
to condemn must state its reasons for taking property by eminent domain, and those reasons must demonstrate a public necessity to justify
a taking for public use. The issue of public use was always a justiciable
issue, while the issue of public necessity often was not [CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA CONDEMNATION IN PRACTICE 125

(1973)]. Thus, the defendant formerly could have challenged the
functional nature of the project, but could not have challenged the condemnor's determination that the project was necessary. The landmark
California decision delineating this conclusive evidence concept of necessity of taking is People v. Chevalier [52 Cal. 2d 299, 340 P.2d 598
(1959)] where the court held that necessity cannot be made a justiciable issue even though fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion may be
alleged in connection with the condemning body's determination of such
necessity [id. at 307, 340 P.2d at 603]. The Eminent Domain Law,
however, now provides some bases for challenging necessity. A resolution may not be effective if there is a gross abuse of discretion, if there
is bribery, or if inadequate notice and opportunity to be heard is given
to affected property owners (§§1245.255, 1245.270, 1245.235). The
consequences of this change will be to permit arguments unrelated to
compensation to be raised at trial, challenging the ability of a public
entity to take property by eminent domain. These bases of attacking
the right to take were not in the California Law Revision Commission's
proposed legislation, but were included by the legislature, indicating its
concern that the defendant be permitted to challenge the rationale of
a taking under certain circumstances.
Procedures for determining compensation for the property taken have
also been changed. Compensation is determined by a real estate appraiser who values the property to be taken on a specific date which
is called the date of valuation. Unless an earlier date is applicable, the
new date of valuation is the date upon which the deposit of the amount
of probable compensation is made. Thus, a fixed point in time is given
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 7
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on which the appraisal by the plaintiff's or defendant's appraiser may
be based. Formerly, neither the making of a deposit nor the taking of
possession had any bearing on the date of valuation, which was the date
of service of summons. The condemnor is now permitted to establish
an early date of valuation by depositing the probable amount of compensation in the state treasury. Presumably the earlier date of valuation
will prevent a loss or gain of property value caused by the impending
project which will make a true valuation of the property easier to obtain
[REPoRT, supra, at 1646]. The California Law Revision Commission felt
that the condemnor should be permitted to establish an early date of valuation by depositing the probable amount of compensation for withdrawal by the property owner. In addition to providing a needed incentive to condemnors to deposit approximate compensation, the rule accords with the view that the property should be valued at the time payment is made [RPorT, supra, at 1646].

Compensation is additionally permitted for loss of goodwill in a business conducted on property taken by eminent domain (§1263.510).
Prior court decisions did not allow compensation for business losses in
eminent domain. Generally, loss of business or goodwill to an owner
or lessee of a condemned parcel was not considered, as only loss of or
damage to the physical property was compensable [People v. Ayon, 54
Cal. 2d 217, 224, 5 Cal. Rptr. 151, 154-55 (1960)]. This holding
has been superseded by Section 1263.510, which permits recovery for
losses of business and goodwill where prudent business practices and relocation expenses could not have mitigated such losses.
The new law also permits recovery for damage to a portion of a parcel
of land not taken by the eminent domain action, regardless of the precise
location of the damage-causing portion of the project (§1263.420(b)).
California courts have traditionally held that a party has no action for
severance damages unless the project causing the alleged damage is located on the property taken from the party himself [See, e.g., People
v. Symons, 54 Cal. 2d 855, 861, 9 Cal. Rptr. 363, 367 (1960)]. This
rule has been abrogated by Section 1263.420(b) of the Code of Civil
Procedure, permitting property owners to recover severance damages if
a portion of their property has been taken and damage to the remaining
portion occurs not only because of the severance, but also because of
the proximity of the project.
See Generally:
1) 12 CALiFORmA LAW REVSION COMi'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENIAUONS, AND STUDIES 1601 (1974).
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Property; prohibition of acceleration clauses
Civil Code §2924.6 (new).
AB 706 (Sieroty); STATS 1975, Ch 850
Chapter 850 has added Section 2924.6 to the Civil Code to prohibit
the use of certain types of acceleration clauses in mortgages or deeds
of trust, secured by residential real property, executed or refinanced on
or after January 1, 1976. Acceleration clauses are now unenforceable
when the title of residential property is transferred as the result of (1)
the death of an obligor where the transfer is to the spouse who is also
an obligor, (2) a spouse becoming a co-owner of the property, (3) a
dissolution, legal separation, or property settlement agreement which requires the obligor to continue to make payments so that the spouse,
who is also an obligor, becomes the owner of the property, (4) the creation of an inter vivos trust of the property by the obligor in which he
or she is the beneficiary, and (5) the creation of a junior encumbrance.
The first four situations are transfers of interest in which an original
obligor is still responsible for the loan and, consequently, there is no
loss of security. Despite this fact, a lender previously could threaten
to enforce an acceleration clause in order to extract a new loan at a
higher interest rate, thus forcing the obligor to acquiesce to the higher
rate, pay the remaining principle, or be declared in default [Comment,
Applying the Brakes to Acceleration Clauses: Controlling Their Misuse
in Real Property Secured Transactions, 9 CAL. WEs. L. REv. 514, 519
(1973)]. Civil Code Section 2924.6 prevents this abuse by making
acceleration clauses on transfers of residential real property unenforceable when one of the above transfers occurs. With respect to "due-onencumbrance" acceleration clauses (the fifth situation delineated
above), a recent California Supreme Court decision held that such
clauses were enforceable only if there was justification for such enforcement from the standpoint of the lender's legitimate interest in his security [La Sala v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 882, 97
Cal. Rptr. 849, 860 (1971)]. Thus, a "due-on-encumbrance" clause
was enforceable as long as it was reasonably calculated to protect the
security interest of the lender. Section 2924.6 now makes any "dueon-encumbrance" clause unenforceable whether the lender's security is
impaired or not. In addition, a waiver of any provision of Section
2924.6 is contrary to public policy and therefore void. Finally, Section
2924.6 does not affect the enforceability of any type of acceleration
clause not described in the section, nor does it affect any loans made
prior to January 1, 1976.
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 7
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See Generally:
1) CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALnFORNIu REAL ESTATE SECURED TRNSAC-

TIONS, §§4.44-4.68 (1970), §§4.15-4.18, 4.22 (Supp. 1974) (acceleration clauses).

Property; late payment charges
Civil Code §2954.4 (new), §2954.5 (amended).
AB 398 (Deddeh); STATS 1975, Ch 736
Section 2954.4 has been added to the Civil Code by Chapter 736,
affecting late charges on loans secured by mortgages or deeds of trust
made after January 1, 1976 on single-family dwellings occupied by the
borrower within 90 days of the execution of the mortgage or deed
of trust. Section 2954.4(a) provides that a payment on a loan is not
late until ten days after it has become due. At that time a late payment
charge, not to exceed six percent of the installment due or five dollars,
whichever is greater, may be levied against the borrower. If a particular
installment is paid on time, late payment charges cannot be assessed
against it even though previous installments are past due, and no late
charges may be imposed more than once on the same installment. Furthermore, where several installments are due or past-due, any payment
tendered to the lender must be applied to the most recent installment
owing, to protect the borrower from additional late charges. Excluded
from the scope of Section 2954.4 are loans made by credit unions,
industrial loan companies, personal property brokers, or real estate brokers.

Civil Code Section 2954.5(a) formerly required a lender to give a
borrower at least six days from the mailing of a default notice to cure
the delinquency before assessing a late payment charge, unless a billing
notice was sent for each installment due stating the date upon which
a late payment would be assessed. Chapter 736 has amended this section to extend the period of time the lender must wait to ten days. Section 2954.5 is applicable to all types of lenders, including those excluded
in Section 2954.4, but only to loans executed on or after January 1,
1976.
See Generally:

1)

2)

5 PAC. L.J., REvmw OF SELECrED 1973 CALnOmR
_ LFGISLATION 310, 311 (1974)
(Consumer Protection; real estate loans).

Comment, Late Charges as Liquidated Damages or Penalty, 62 CAL. L. REv. 465

(1974).

Property; variable interest rate loans
Civil Code §1916.5 (amended).
AB 640 (Hayden); STATS 1975, Ch 338
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Section 1916.5 has been amended by Chapter 338 to restrict changes
in interest rates for variable interest rate loans. In addition to the requirement that the interest rate change not exceed one-fourth of one
percent in any semi-annual period, the original interest rate shall not
be increased by a total of more than 2.5 percentage points. There is
no similar limitation on the amount of allowable decrease in the interest
rate.,
Section 1916.5 has also been amended to give the borrower an option to extend the term of the loan for such period as may be required
to amortize the loan without increasing the existing monthly payment,
but not exceeding a maximum term of 40 years. The exercise of this
option is limited to increases in interest rates of loans by commercial
banks pursuant to Section 1227 of the Financial Code, or by a savings
and loan association pursuant to Section 7150(a) of the Financial Code.
COMMENT
The changes within Section 1916.5 of the Civil Code apparently are
designed both to protect the borrower and to make variable interest rate
loans more desirable to the borrower by setting a limit on the increase
and also providing an assurance that the monthly payment will not increase. However, it is possible that such changes may defeat one of the
purposes of variable interest rate loans, which is to help lenders lend
and relend funds in short supply during inflationary periods. (For a general discussion on variable interest rate loans, see Comment, The Variable Interest Rate Clause and Its Use in CaliforniaReal Estate Transactions, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 468 (1972)).
The option provided to the borrower in Section 1916.5(e) to extend
the term of the loan may be greatly limited by conflicting federal statutes. The Veterans Administration will only guarantee loans with a
term of 30 years or less [38 U.S.C. §1803(d) (1970)], and the Federal Housing Authority will usually insure loans with a term of 35 years
or less [12 U.S.C. §1715(d) (6) (1970)]. Even conventional loans
have certain limitations upon the maximum term since such loans are
often discounted and resold. Furthermore, federal law provides that no
home mortgage shall be collected as collateral security by the Home
Loan Bank, if the maturity of the loan is more than 30 years [12 U.S.C.
§1430(b) (1970)].
Property; mobilehome tenants' rights
Civil Code §§789.4, 789.7a, 789.7b, 789.7c, 789.12, 789.13 (new);
789.5, 789.7, 789.8, 789.9, 789.10 (amended).
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 7
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SB 701 (Joint Committee on Aging); STATS 1975, Ch 1092
Opposition: Western Mobilehome Association
AB 548 (MacDonald); STATS 1975, Ch 146
Chapters 146 and 1092 have been enacted to clarify and expand the
law relating to mobilehome parks and to provide protection for mobilehome park tenants from actual or constructive eviction by park owners
or managers. The legislature has stated that the high cost of moving,
installing, and landscaping mobilehomes makes moving particularly burdensome for mobilehome park tenants, and that such tenants therefore
need unique protection [CAL. Civ. CODE §789.4].
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 1092, mobilehome tenancy could
be terminated (1) if the tenant violated a local ordinance or state law
relating to mobilehomes, (2) if the tenant's conduct interfered with the
mobilehome park management or substantially annoyed other tenants,
(3) if the tenant violated the rules and regulations of the mobilehome
park, (4) if the tenant failed to pay rent, utility charges, or reasonable
incidental service charges, or (5) if the park was condemned by the government or its use was changed by the management. Section 789.5
(d) (1) now specifies that termination on the grounds of alleged violations of local or state laws relating to mobilehomes can only occur after
the tenant has received notice of the violation from the appropriate government agency and has failed to correct the violation in a reasonable
time. In addition, conduct that interferes with mobilehome park management is no longer sufficient grounds for termination (§789.5(d)
(2)); however, a tenancy may still be terminated if the tenant's conduct
is a substantial annoyance to the other tenants. Civil Code Section
789.5(d) (3), permitting termination of a tenancy for violation of the
mobilehome park rules and regulations, has been amended to require
the management to give the tenant (1) written notice of the alleged rule
violation, and (2) at least seven days within which to correct the violation before terminating the tenancy. The management may no longer
change the rules regarding the use of recreational facilities unless the
change is preceded by 60 days' written notice to all tenants. Finally,
Section 789.5(d) (5) has added the requirement of a minimum of 12
months' written notice to tenants and prospective tenants of any proposed changes in the use of the park before it may be converted to a
different use. Strictly interpreted, Section 789.5(d) (5) would mean
that if a person moved into the mobilehome park 11 months after
notice of the proposed change was originally given, such new tenant
would have to be given separate notice, thus postponing the implemen-
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tation of the change for an additional 12 months. This would have the
effect of requiring the mobilehome park management to choose between
accepting no new tenants for a one-year period commencing with the
giving of notice or postponing the implementation of the change. When
such a proposed change actually occurs, 60 days notice to vacate must
be given pursuant to Section 789.5 (a), and the reason for the termination must be given pursuant to Section 789.5 (f).
In addition to clarifying the situation in which a mobilehome tenancy
may be terminated, Chapter 1092 also amends Civil Code Section 789.7
to clearly delineate what fees may not be assessed against a mobilehome
park tenant by the management. Prior law prohibited management
from charging any fees other than rent, utilities, or incidental reasonable
service charges (§789.7). Section 789.7 has been amended to specifically prohibit (1) any charges for keeping pets, unless special pet facilities or services are provided, (2) charges for guests who stay less than
14 days in any calendar month, (3) per-person fees for members of the
tenant's immediate family, and (4) fees levied for enforcing the rules
and regulations of the park. Furthermore, the management is required
to provide prospective tenants with a list of the actual services for which
a fee vill be charged.
Chapter 1092 has added Section 789.7a, which permits guests to visit
a tenant without registering with the park management when the guests
do not stay more than 14 days in any calendar month. Section 789.7b
has also been added to require that billings for utilities be prepared in
a uniform manner when the park management provides a master meter
service for the tenants, and when such a billing service is utilized, that
the prevailing residential utility rates be posted in a conspicuous place
within the mobilehome park. Finally, Section 789.7c states that membership in any private club or organization which is a precondition or
condition for tenancy in a mobilehome park shall not be denied to any
person on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, ancestry,
or on the basis of any other grounds prohibited by Section 35700 of
the Health and Safety Code.
Chapter 1092 has amended Civil Code Section 789.8 to permit landscaping requirements, such as trimmed lawns, to be a part of the rules
and regulations of the mobilehome park, despite the fact that landscaping fees are prohibited. Section 789.8 also has been amended to prohibit any charge for additional services after the tenant has moved in
unless he has been given at least 60 days' notice of the charges. The prohibition against entry fees as a condition of the tenancy is retained, with
the additional requirement that any service for which the management
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 7
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wishes to charge the tenant must be requested in writing by the tenant or his or her agent. Furthermore, Chapter 1092 has retained the
prohibition against the assessment of a sales commission from a tenant
by the management when it has done nothing to sell the tenant's mobilehome. Civil Code Section 789.12 has been added to allow the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees and costs in any litigation arising
out of Sections 789.5 through 789.11. Finally, Section 789.13 has been
added to permit the trial court, in its discretion, to award damages -to
the tenant, not to exceed $500, for each wilful violation by the park
owner of the provisions of Sections 789.5 through 789.11 in addition to
his or her actual damages at law.
See Generally:
1) 5 PAC. LI., REVIEW OF SEL.CrnE 1973 CALIFORNIA
bilehomes-prohibition of conditions of tenancy).
2) 4 PAc. LJ., REvIw OF SELECTmD 1972 CALiFoRNIA
bilehomes-deficiency judgments).
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Property; waiver of tenants' rightspeaceable entry
Civil Code §§1953, 1954 (new).
SB 314 (Petris); STATS 1975, Ch 302
Support: Associated Students of University of California Student
Lobby
Opposition: California Association of Realtors
Section 1953 has been added to the 'Civil Code to insure that specific
statutory rights of tenants are not waived in a lease. Prior to this addition, the landlord could obtain a waiver of any right except those listed
under the retaliatory eviction and habitability provisions [CAL. Civ.
CODE §§1942.1, 1942.5]. In any lease executed on or after January
1, 1976, relinquishment of security deposit rights [CAL. CIV. CODE
§1950.5], substantive or procedural rights against the landlord, or any
rights with respect to tort liability are specifically prohibited as contrary
to public policy. Section 1953(b) further requires that the landlord
present the tenant with any waiver provision not prohibited by Sections
1942.1, 1942.5, 1953 (a), and 1954 before the tenant enters possession.
However, if a proper waiver is in the original lease, the landlord does
not have to present the waiver again at renewal.
Section 1954 has been added to the Civil Code to delineate the situations in which a landlord may enter leased premises. Prior to this addition, the law dealt only with forcible entry by the landlord or others,
or entry pursuant to an unlawful detainer action [CAL. CODE CIV.
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PR.oc. §§1159-1179a]. The new provision allows a landlord to enter a
dwelling unit without notice if the premises have been abandoned, if
there is an emergency, or if the entry is authorized by a court order.
In all other situations, particularly where the landlord is entering to
repair, alter, or decorate the premises, or is exhibiting the premises to
prospective tenants or purchasers, the entry must be preceded by reasonable notice and must be made during normal business hours unless the
tenant otherwise consents. In the absence of evidence to the contrary,
24. hours' notice is deemed to be reasonable [CAL. CIV. CODE §1954
(d)].
COMMENT
Chapter 302 prevents the landlord from imposing harsh terms upon
the tenant by limiting the rights he can garner for himself in the lease.
Traditionally, the landlord has had superior bargaining power, and in
the case of indigent or uneducated tenants, he has been able to force
the tenant into a unilaterally beneficial lease by taking advantage of the
tenant's ignorance of his rights [Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent
Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEO. L.J. 519, 522 (1966)]. By
prohibiting the waiver of certain rights, Chapter 302 curbs the power
of the landlord to extract oppressive terms from his tenants. In standard leases, the tenant often acquieses to the landlord's demand of a right
of entry at any time to inspect or repair without prior notice [8 CAL.
LEG. FoRMs, TRANS. GuiDE 35-676, 35-684]. Section 1954 specifically states that the landlord shall not harass the tenant by abusing his
right of entry, and must now give reasonable notice to the tenant before
such an entry which must be made during normal business hours.
See Generally:
1) 3 WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALinoRu,

LAw, Landlord-Tenant §§541, 542 (8th ed.

1974) (forcible entry).

Property; discrimination in housing
Health and Safety Code §35741.5 (new); §§35700, 35711, 35720,
35730.5, 35740, 35742 (amended).
SB 844 (Petris); STATS 1975, Ch 1189
Support: Attorney General; Department of Housing and Community
Development
Opposition: California Association of Realtors; California Apartment Association
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 7
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The Rumford Fair Housing Act [CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE

§35700 et seq.] has been amended by Chapter 1189 to provide administrative remedies for those persons who have been discriminated against
in housing accommodations because of their sex or marital status. Prior
to these changes, the Rumford Act applied only to discrimination based
on race, color, ancestry, religion, or national origin. Housing accomodations that fall within the purview of the Rumford Act include publicly-assisted housing (housing the financing of which is secured or
guaranteed by a public agency), and housing subject to the Unruh Civil
Rights Act [CAL. CIV. CODE §51]. Hence, the Rumford Act now prohibits individuals engaged in leasing, renting, or selling of housing accommodations from discriminating on the basis of sex or marital status.
This legislation further prohibits an owner or lessor from making oral
or written inquiries as to the status of a potential buyer or lessee, and
forbids homelending institutions from refusing a person applying for
such assistance solely because of sex or marital status [CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE §35720]. The effect of Chapter 1189 on residential
complexes catering to a particular class of tenants (e.g., single people,
married couples) will apparently be to prohibit exclusive rentals to such
members of restricted classes.
Persons alleging discrimination based on the new classifications may
file a verified complaint with the Fair Employment Practice Commission, which now has jurisdiction to receive, investigate, and rule on complaints of sex discrimination [CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §35730.5].
The Commission may grant specific performance, injunctive relief,' or
damages if it finds the alleged discrimination has in fact taken place.
COMMENT

Prior to the enactment of Chapter 1189, the remedies provided by
the Rumford Act were not available in cases of sex discrimination in
housing, and such discrimination could be alleviated only through the
courts. The Unruh Civil Rights Act [CAL. CIV. CODE §51] prohibits
discrimination based on race, national origin, religion, ancestry, color,
and sex in the operation of any business establishment. In interpreting
Section 51 the California Supreme Court stated that identification of
particular bases of classification added in the Unruh Act are illustrative
rather than restrictive [In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 212, 474 P.2d 992,
995, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 27 (1970)]; and hence anyone could sue if he
or she could show arbitrary discrimination. In a 1973 opinion, the Attorney General stated that "business establishments", as used in Section
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51, applied to owners of triplexes, duplexes, non-owner occupied single
family dwellings and any other housing accommodations offered for sale,
rent, lease, or other income or profit [56 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 546
(1973)]. Therefore, the Unruh Civil Rights Act appears to apply to
housing discrimination, and gives a legal remedy to women who are discriminated against. In addition to the Unruh Act, a federal remedy is
available. Congress amended the United States Code in 1974 to prohibit housing discrimination based on sex, and provided civil remedies
enforceable in either state or federal court [42 U.S.C. §3 604 (1970)1.
1)
2)

5 WnrrN, SUMMARY OF CAun~oRN_.

L w, Constitutional Law §431 (8th ed.

1974), (housing discrimination).
Note, Pioneering Approaches to Confront Sex Bias in Housing, 24 CLEV. ST. L.

R v. 79 (1975).

Property; "For Sale" signs
Civil Code §713 (new); §712 (amended).
AB 604 (Bannai); STATS 1975, Ch 147
Support: League of California Cities; California Association of Real
Estate Brokers
Civil Code Section 712 has been amended by Chapter 147 to prohibit
restrictions preventing the grantee or his or her agent from displaying
signs on the grantee's property advertising it for sale when such restrictions are placed in any conveyance of a fee or purchase money security
instrument. Prior to this amendment, Section 712 only prohibited restrictions against the grantee'sindividual right to display such signs as being
an unlawful restraint on alienation, and not against the right of the
grantee's agent. In addition, the size of such signs is now restricted to a
"reasonable size," rather than a "customary and reasonable size." Furthermore, Section 713 has been added to the Civil Code to permit an
owner or his agent to display a sign on his property advertising it for
sale, lease, or exchange so long as the sign conforms with local ordinances that reasonably regulate the size of such signs. The new law,
which operates retroactively, applies to all types of real estate and is not
limited to residential property.
It appears that the purpose of these changes is to permit property
owners to delegate the details of selling or leasing property to their
agents. In the past, city councils had been able to enact ordinances
which prohibited any sign on an owner's property from advertising the
agent's name, address, or telephone number. These ordinances were
declared constitutional in Burk v. Municipal Courtfor the Whittier DisPacific Law Journal Vol. 7
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trict [229 Cal. App. 2d 696, 40 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1964)] where the
court stated that the regulation of signs in residential areas was within
the "sound discretion of the [local] legislative body . . ." [Id. at

703, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 429]. Thus, the owner (particularly an out-oftown owner) was put at a disadvantage in attempting to sell his property
in that he had to refer potential buyers to his agent. In enacting the
changes regarding signs, the state legislature has determined that the
local governments should not have the discretion to absolutely forbid
agents to have their names on signs. The effect will apparently be to
overturn the Burk ruling and to disapprove local ordinances which unreasonably restrict the posting of such signs.
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